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ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME WITH
RISK-SENSITIVE COST
ANUP BISWAS AND SUBHAMAY SAHA
Abstract. Zero-sum games with risk-sensitive cost criterion are considered with under-
lying dynamics being given by controlled stochastic differential equations. Under the
assumption of geometric stability on the dynamics, we completely characterize all possible
saddle point strategies in the class of stationary Markov controls. In addition, we also
establish existence-uniqueness result for the value function of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs
equation.
1. Introduction
This article concerns with zero-sum game for risk-sensitive costs where the underlying
dynamics of the players are given by non-degenerate controlled stochastic differential equa-
tions. There are two players, one of them tries to minimize his/her payoff and the other
one tries to maximize it. The maximizing player may be thought of as nature who may
choose a parametrization of the model to be totally adverse to the other controller, in a
non-anticipative way. The admissible controls (or actions) of each player are assumed to
take values in a space of probability measures over a compact metric space. In other words,
each player chooses his/her control from a given collection of mixed strategies. As the sys-
tem evolves, the costs are accumulated and the performance of a control policy is measured
by a long-run average of risk-sensitive cost criterion. The main objective of this work is to
find solution for the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation characterizing the
value of the game and rendering saddle point strategies. The key results of this article can
be roughly described as follows.
• Existence and Uniqueness of solution. The HJI equation has an eigenpair (V, λ) ∈
C2(Rd)× R where λ is the value of the game. Moreover, this solution is unique.
• Verification result. Any measurable mini-max selector of the HJI equation form a
saddle point strategy, and any saddle point strategy in the class of stationary Markov
controls can be obtained as a measurable mini-max selector of the HJI equation.
Risk-sensitive (or exponential-of-integral) control has been an active area of research in the
field of control theory. These problems were introduced by Jacobson [26] in seventies. We
also refer to Whittle [33] and references therein for an early account of the risk-sensitive
control literature. Most of these problems have concentrated on minimizing the risk-senstive
payoff. Among the most relevant to the present are [2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 20, 31]. On the
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other hand the number of literature on stochastic differential games with risk-sensitive cost
criterion are very few [6, 8, 18, 21]. Bas¸ar [6] considers non-zero sum game with finite
horizon risk-sensitive costs and establishes existence of Nash equilibrium whereas Ghosh
et.al. [21] obtain existence of Nash equilibrium with long-run average of risk-sensitive payoff.
Both zero-sum and nonzero-sum games with finite horizon risk-sensitive cost criterion have
been considered by El-Karoui and Hamade`ne [18] where the authors have used backward
stochastic differential equation to prove existence of a saddle-point and an equilibrium
point for respectively, the zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. In a recent work Basu and
Ghosh [8] consider a zero-sum game with long–run average of risk-sensitive cost and adopt
the standard vanishing discount approximation to establish existence of saddle points which
are mini-max selector of the associated HJI equation. This work is done with bounded drift,
diffusion coefficient and cost functions. After a careful reading we have found that the proofs
of [8](see Theorem 3 and 4 there) contain some crucial error that do not seem to have an
easy fix. In [8] the authors have constructed an eigenpair for the HJI equation and have
made an attempt to show that this eigenvalue is the value of the game. But this can not be
true as a recent work of Berestycki and Rossi [9] suggests that there are uncountably many
eigenvalues (for the uncontrolled linear operator) with positive eigenfunctions. Therefore,
one has to look for the principal eigenvalue of HJI equation. In particular, one has to show
that the eigenvalue obtained by the vanishing discount method is actually the principal
eigenvalue for the HJI equation. We show in this article that under certain conditions, the
value of the game can be seen as the principal eigenvalue of the HJI equation. This problem
is closely related to the charatecterization of the principal eigenvalue (or optimal value)
for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB) type equations which have been studied by several
authors recently [3, 28, 24]. Let us also mention [7, 17, 27] where eigenvalue type problems
for the HJB equation related to the the ergodic control problems in Rd are studied.
In this article we consider a large class (compared to [8]) of control problems. We prove
not only the existence of a saddle point strategy, but also characterize all possible saddle
point strategies in the class of stationary Markov controls. In addition, we also obtain the
uniqueness of the value function for the HJI equations. To find the principal eigenpair of
the HJI equation we start with the Dirichlet eigenvalue value problems in bounded domains
where existence of principal eigenpair is known and then increase these domains to Rd. This
idea was used earlier by Biswas in [10] but for a simpler setting. The approach of [8, 21]
is based on parabolic PDE where one introduces an additional risk-sensitive parameter θ
multiplied with the running cost and studies the associated parabolic PDE, viewing θ as
a time parameter. It seems this approach is not very much helpful in studying our game
problem whereas the eigenvalue approach of [10] (see also [17]) seems more natural in current
situation. Another advantage in using the latter approach is the ease in obtaining stochastic
representation of the value functions which helps us to apply strong maximum principle. It
should be kept in mind that [10] deals with a minimization problem and it does not discuss
characterization of the optimal stationary Markov controls. It turns out that the game
problem is much more involved than the minimization problem. One of the reasons for
this difficulty is that our game is a generalization to both minimization and maximization
problems with risk-sensitive cost, and it is not easy to convert a maximization problem to a
minimization problem of the same type. Therefore, we separately study the maximization
ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME WITH RISK-SENSITIVE COST 3
problem with risk-sensitive costs in Section 3 (see Theorem 3.1) and characterize the optimal
stationary Markov controls.
We borrow several results from [3] where an interesting characterization of the strict
monotonicity property of the principal eigenvalues of second order elliptic operators has
been studied. Using this characterization the authors then study a minimization problem
in [3] for the risk-sensitive cost. We also use the stochastic representation formula of the
principal eigenfunction from [3]. The problem we consider in this article does not follow
in a straightforward manner from [3] and the level of technical difficulties is also more
involved. For instance, in case of the minimization problem it is seen in [3, 10] that any
limit of the principal eigenvalues of the HJB operator considered in bounded domains, as
the domains increase to Rd, is suboptimal, and therefore, by choosing a selector of the HJB
one proves that the limiting eigenvalue is actually the principal one and hence, it has to be
optimal. But this simple policy does not seem to work for the maximization problem. So
to study the maximization problem we first perturb the cost to a norm-like running cost
and show that the maximization problem can be solved for this perturbed cost. Then using
some stability estimate we could show that it is possible to pass to the limit and solve the
original maximization problem (see Lemma 3.4 and 3.5 below).
Rest of the article is organized as follows. In the remaining part of this section we
summarize the notations. Section 2 introduces the problem setup and the main result. In
section 3, we study a maximization problem with risk-sensitive criterion, and finally section
4 deals with the proof of the main Theorem.
Notation. The standard Euclidean norm in Rd is denoted by | · |. The set of nonnegative
real numbers is denoted by R+, N stands for the set of natural numbers, and 1 denotes the
indicator function. Given two real numbers a and b, the minimum (maximum) is denoted
by a ∧ b (a ∨ b), respectively. The closure, boundary, and the complement of a set A ⊂ Rd
are denoted by A¯, ∂A, and Ac, respectively. We denote by τ(A) the first exit time of the
process {Xt} from the set A ⊂ R
d, defined by
τ(A) := inf {t > 0 : Xt 6∈ A} .
The open ball of radius r in Rd, centered at the origin, is denoted by Br, and we let
τr := τ(Br), and τ˘r := τ(B
c
r).
The term domain in Rd refers to a nonempty, connected open subset of the Euclidean
space Rd. For a domain D ⊂ Rd, the space Ck(D) (C∞(D)) refers to the class of all real-
valued functions on D whose partial derivatives up to order k (of any order) exist and are
continuous, and Cb(D) denotes the set of all bounded continuous real-valued functions on
D. In addition Cc(D) denotes the class of functions in C(D) that have compact support,
and C0(R
d) the class of continuous functions on Rd that vanish at infinity. By a slight abuse
of notation, whenever the whole space Rd is concerned, we write f ∈ Ck(Rd) whenever
f ∈ Ck(D) for all bounded domains D ⊂ Rd. The space Lp(D), p ∈ [1,∞), stands for the
Banach space of (equivalence classes of) measurable functions f satisfying
∫
D
|f(x)|p dx <
∞, and L∞(D) is the Banach space of functions that are essentially bounded in D. We shall
use the notation ‖·‖∞ to denote the L
∞ norm on the underlying domain. The standard
Sobolev space of functions on D whose generalized derivatives up to order k are in Lp(D),
equipped with its natural norm, is denoted by Wk,p(D), k ≥ 0, p ≥ 1.
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In general, if X is a space of real-valued functions on D, Xloc consists of all functions f
such that fϕ ∈ X for every ϕ ∈ C∞c (D), the space of smooth functions on D with compact
support. In this manner we obtain for example the space W2,ploc(D).
We adopt the notation ∂i :=
∂
∂xi
and ∂ij :=
∂2
∂xi∂xj
for i, j ∈ N. We often use the standard
summation rule that repeated subscripts and superscripts are summed from 1 through d.
For example,
1
2 a
ij∂ijϕ+ b
i∂iϕ :=
1
2
d∑
i,j=1
aij
∂2ϕ
∂xi∂xj
+
d∑
i=1
bi
∂ϕ
∂xi
.
2. Settings and main results
The following assumptions (A1)-(A3) on the controlled diffusion (2.1) will be in effect
throughout this article unless otherwise mentioned.
(A1) Local Lipschitz continuity: The function
b =
[
b1, . . . , bd
]
T
: Rd ×U1 × U2 → R
d, σ =
[
σ
ij
]
: Rd → Rd×d
are locally Lipschitz in x (uniformly in the other two variables for b) with a Lipschitz
constant CR > 0 depending on R > 0. In other words, we have
|b(x, u)− b(y, u)| + ‖σ(x)− σ(y)‖ ≤ CR |x− y| ∀x, y ∈ BR , u ∈ U1 × U2 .
We also assume that the action spaces Ui, i = 1, 2, are compact metric spaces and b
is jointly continuous in (x, u).
(A2) Affine growth condition: b and σ satisfy a global growth condition of the form
sup
u∈U1×U2
〈b(x, u), x〉+ + ‖σ(x)‖2 ≤ C0
(
1 + |x|2
)
∀x ∈ Rd,
for some constant C0 > 0, where ‖σ‖
2 := trace
(
σσ
T
)
.
(A3) Nondegeneracy: For each R > 0, it holds that
d∑
i,j=1
aij(x)ξiξj ≥ C
−1
R |ξ|
2 ∀x ∈ BR ,
and for all ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξd)
T ∈ Rd, where a := σσT.
Set of all probability measures on Ui is denoted by U˜i, i = 1, 2. In our control model we
have two players and U˜i denotes the relaxed action space for the the i-th player, i = 1, 2.
We extend the drift b : Rd × U˜1 × U˜2 → R
d as follows: for νi ∈ U˜i, i = 1, 2,
b(x, ν1, ν2) =
∫
U1×U2
b(x, u1, u2) ν1(du1) ν2(du2).
It is easy to verify that the extended drift satisfies (A1)-(A2) with Ui replaced by U˜i, i = 1, 2.
One major advantage of this extension is that b(x, ·, ·) : U˜1× U˜2 → R
d becomes coordinate-
wise convex. This extension would play a key role in the selection of saddle point below.
The controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE) is given by
dXs = b(Xs, U
1
s , U
2
s ) ds+ σ(Xs) dWs, (2.1)
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where W is a standard d-dimensional Wiener process on some complete, filtered probabil-
ity space (Ω,F, {Ft},P), and U
i is an U˜i valued process satisfying following admissibility
condition: for s < t, the completion of σ{U ir,Wr : r ≤ s, i = 1, 2} relative to {F,P} is inde-
pendent ofWt−Ws. Let us clarify that we do not fix any probability space a priori and this
is an important technical point which allow as to consider a fairly large class of admissible
control. It is well known that given a complete, filtered probability space (Ω,F, {Ft},P)
with a Wiener process W , under (A1)–(A3), for any progressively measurable (U1, U2)
there exists a unique solution of (2.1) [4, Theorem 2.2.4]. We define the family of operators
Lu˜ : C2(Rd) 7→ C(Rd), where u˜ ∈ U˜1 × U˜2 plays the role of a parameter, by
Lu˜f(x) = 12 a
ij(x) ∂ijf(x) + b
i(x, u˜1, u˜2) ∂if(x) , u˜ = (u˜1, u˜2) ∈ U˜1 × U˜2 . (2.2)
By a stationary Markov control for the i-th player we mean a control of the form U it = vi(Xt)
for a Borel measurable map vi : R
d → U˜i, i = 1, 2. By an abuse of notation we will refer to
vi as stationary Markov control. Let U
SM
i denote the set of all stationary Markov controls
for the i-th player. It is well known that under vi ∈ U
SM
i (2.1) has a unique strong solution
[23]. Moreover, under v = (v1, v2) ∈ U
SM
1 × U
SM
2 , the process X is strong Markov, and we
denote its transition kernel by P tv(x, · ). It also follows from the work in [13] that under
v ∈ USM1 × U
SM
2 , the transition probabilities of X have densities which are locally Ho¨lder
continuous. Thus Lv defined by
Lvf(x) =
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ijf(x) + b
i
(
x, v1(x), v2(x)
)
∂if(x) , v = (v1, v2) ∈ U
SM
1 × U
SM
2 ,
for f ∈ C2(Rd), is the generator of a strongly-continuous semigroup on Cb(R
d), which is
strong Feller. When v ∈ USM1 × U
SM
2 we use v as subscript in Lv to distinguish it from L
u˜,
u˜ ∈ U˜1× U˜2, defined in the preceding paragraph. We let P
v
x denote the probability measure
and Evx the expectation operator on the canonical space of the process under the control
v ∈ USM1 × U
SM
2 , conditioned on the process X starting from x ∈ R
d at t = 0. For every i
the set USMi is metrizable with a compact metric [4, Section 2.2.4], [14]. In fact, vn → v in
USMi if and only if∫
Rd
f(x)
∫
Ui
g(x, ui)vn(dui|x) dx
n→∞
−−−→
∫
Rd
f(x)
∫
Ui
g(x, ui)v(dui|x) dx,
for all f ∈ L1(Rd)∩L2(Rd) and g ∈ Cb(R
d×Ui). Recall that τ(D) denotes the first exit time
of the process X from domain D. A pair stationary Markov controls (v1, v2) ∈ U
SM
1 × U
SM
2
is said to be stable if the associated process is positive recurrent i.e., Evx[τ(D
c)] <∞ for all
x ∈ Dc. It is known that for a non-degenerate diffusion the property of positive recurrence
is independent of domain, i.e., if it holds for one domain D then it also holds for every
domain [4, Theorem 2.6.10].
Let us now introduce the set of all admissible controls for our game problem. We follow
the approach of [15, 30]. A control is called a feedback control if it is progressively measurable
with respect to the natural filtration generated by X. More precisely, we say U i is of
feedback form if for some measurable fi : [0,∞) × C([0,∞) : R
d) → U˜i we have U
i
t =
fi(t,X[0,t]), i = 1, 2. It should be noted that stationary Markov controls are also feedback
controls. The set of all feedback controls for the i-th player is denoted by Ui, i = 1, 2. We
also refer the members of Ui as admissible controls. By [4, Theorem 2.2.11] we know that
for any (U1, U2) ∈ U1 × U2 (2.1) has a unique weak solution.
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A Borel measurable function ℓ : Rd → R is said to be inf-compact if for any κ ∈ R the
set {x ∈ Rd : ℓ(x) ≤ κ} is compact. It is clear that for any inf-compact function ℓ we have
lim|x|→∞ ℓ(x) = ∞. For a locally bounded function f : R
d → R and (U1, U2) ∈ U1 × U2,
the risk-sensitive average is defined to be
Ex(f, U
1, U2) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
logEx
[
e
∫ T
0
f(Xs,U1s ,U
2
s ) ds
]
, and E(f, U1, U2) = inf
x∈Rd
Ex(f, U
1, U2).
The running cost function for our problem is given by a continuous function c : Rd × U1 ×
U2 → R+ which is locally Lipschitz continuous in its first argument uniformly with respect
to u ∈ U1 × U2. Without loss of generality we assume that c is non-constant function. As
earlier we extend c over Rd × U˜1 × U˜2 as follows: for νi ∈ U˜i, i = 1, 2
c(x, ν1, ν2) =
∫
U1×U2
c(x, u1, u2) ν1(du1) ν2(du2).
In this article the cost criterion is given by Ex(c, U
1, U2), and for notational economy we
shall drop the notation c and denote it by Ex(U
1, U2). We also define
Jinf(x,U
2) = inf
U1∈U1
Ex(U
1, U2), Jsup(x,U
1) = sup
U2∈U2
Ex(U
1, U2). (2.3)
Therefore the upper and lower value of the game are respectively defined as
Λ¯ = inf
U1∈U1
Jsup(x,U
1) = inf
U1∈U1
sup
U2∈U2
Ex(U
1, U2),
Λ = sup
U2∈U2
Jinf(x,U
2) = sup
U2∈U2
inf
U1∈U1
Ex(U
1, U2).
The game is said to have a value if we have
Λ¯ = Λ = Λ (say).
The reader might have observed that we do not write Λ (or Λ¯, Λ) as a function of x. We
show that under certain stability hypothesis (assumed below), the value of the game is
independent of x. Let us now introduce two set of stability assumptions (Conditions 2.1
and 2.2) that will be used in this article. These conditions are generally referred to as
the geometric stability conditions and have been heavily used in the study of discrete and
continuous time Markov control problems. In the context of risk-sensitive controls similar
conditions have been used by [3, 8, 11, 20].
Condition 2.1. There exists a positive function V ∈ C2(Rd), infRd V > 0, and a constant
γ > 0 such that
max
u∈U1×U2
LuV ≤ β 1K − γV, (2.4)
for some compact K ⊂ Rd and constant β. Moreover, the cost function c is bounded, and
‖c‖∞ < γ. (2.5)
Example 2.1. Suppose a = Id and
b(x, u) · x ≤ −|x|, outside a compact setK1 .
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Taking V(x) = exp(|x|) for |x| ≥ 1, we have
LV =
(d− 1
2|x|
+
1
2
+ b(x, u) ·
x
|x|
)
V ≤
(d− 1
2|x|
−
1
2
)
V, for |x| ≥ 1 .
Note that V in Example 2.1 is inf-compact. Below we produce an example where V is
not inf-compact.
Example 2.2. Let d = 1, σ = Id and b(x, u) = −sgn(x)|x|2 + u where u ∈ [0, 1]. Take
V(x) = |x|1+|x| for |x| ≥ 1 and extend it in whole of R as a smooth function so that infRd V > 0.
Then for any γ ∈ (0, 1) we can find a compact set K and a constant β such that
sup
u∈[0,1]
LuV ≤ β 1K − γ V.
Condition 2.2. There exists positive functions V ∈ C2(Rd), infRd V > 0, and ℓ ∈ C(R
d), ℓ
inf-compact, such that
sup
u∈U1×U2
(LuV) ≤ β1K − ℓV, (2.6)
for some constant β and a compact set K. Moreover, the cost function c belongs to Cℓ
where
Cℓ =
{
c : Rd × U1 × U2 → R+ where lim sup
|x|→∞
maxu∈U1×U2 c(x,u)
ℓ(x) ≤ θ for some θ ∈ (0, 1)
}
.
ℓ being inf-compact it is easy to see that for c ∈ Cℓ,
(
ℓ − maxu∈U1×U2 c(x, u)
)
is inf-
compact. Let us remark that if a, b are bounded functions one can not expect (2.6) to hold.
See for instance the Remark 3.4 in [3].
Example 2.3. Let σ be bounded and b : Rd × U→ Rd be such that
〈b(x, u) − b(0, u), x〉 ≤ −κ |x|α, for some α ∈ (1, 2], (x, u) ∈ Rd × U .
Then, V(x) = exp(|x|θα) for |x| ≥ 1, satisfies (2.6) for sufficiently small θ > 0, and ℓ ∼
|x|2α−1. Note that α = 2, σ = Id is considered in [20] in the context of minimization
problem with risk-sensitive criterion.
Let us now state the main result of this article
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that either Condition 2.1 or Condition 2.2 holds. Then there exists
an eigenpair (V,Λ) ∈ C2(Rd)× R, V > 0, that satisfies
max
u˜2∈U˜2
min
u˜1∈U˜1
(1
2
aij∂ijV + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇V + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)V
)
= ΛV, V (0) = 1. (2.7)
Moreover, we have the following
(i) Λ in (2.7) is the value of game i.e., Λ¯ = Λ = Λ.
(ii) If v∗2 is an outer maximizing selector of
max
u˜2∈U˜2
min
u˜1∈U˜1
(1
2
aij∂ijV + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇V + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)V
)
= ΛV, (2.8)
and v∗1 is an outer minimizing selector of
min
u˜1∈U˜1
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(1
2
aij∂ijV + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇V + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)V
)
= ΛV, (2.9)
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then the pair (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ∈ U
SM
1 × U
SM
2 is a saddle point strategy i.e.,
E(v∗1 , U
2) ≤ E(v∗1 , v
∗
2) = Λ ≤ E(U
1, v∗2), ∀U
1 ∈ U1, and U
2 ∈ U2.
(iii) The eigenfunction V is unique in the class C2(Rd), provided V (0) = 1.
(iv) If (vˆ1, vˆ2) ∈ U
SM
1 × U
SM
2 is a saddle point strategy in the above sense then vˆ1 is an
outer minimizing selector of (2.9) and vˆ2 is an outer maximizing selector of (2.8).
For existence of measurable selector we refer the readers to [1, Chapter 18]. Such existence
of measurable selector will be used in several places in this article. Also note that by [19,
Theorem 3], the left hand sides of (2.8) and (2.9) are equal. The proof of Theorem 2.1 is
established in Section 4 below.
Before we conclude this section let us recall the definition of principal eigenvalue from
[9]. Let
Lϕ = 12 aˆ
ij(x) ∂ijϕ(x) + bˆ
i(x) ∂iϕ(x) + cˆ(x)ϕ,
where bˆ, cˆ are locally finite, Borel measurable functions, aˆ is continuous and satisfies (A3).
Then the principal eigenvalue of L is defined to be
λ∗ = inf{λ : ∃ ϕ ∈W2,dloc(R
d), ϕ > 0, and Lϕ− λϕ ≤ 0, a.e. in Rd}. (2.10)
The following result is proved in [3, Theorem 3.2 and 3.3].
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that either Conditon 2.1 or Condition 2.2 holds. Then for any
v = (v1, v2) ∈ U
SM
1 × U
SM
2 , the principal eigenvalue of the operator
Lvϕ =
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ijϕ(x) + b
i(x, v(x)) ∂iϕ(x) + c(x, v(x))ϕ,
is Ex(v1, v2) for all x ∈ R
d.
3. A maximization problem
In this section we study a maximization problem which will play a key role in our analysis.
Let r : Rd×U2 → R+ and b : R
d×U2 → R
d be Borel measurable functions that are locally
finite and continuous in u2 for every fixed x. Moreover, b and σ satisfies (A2)-(A3). We
also assume that σ satisfies (A1). As earlier we consider the relaxed action space U˜2 and
extend b, r over U˜2. Then the main result of this section is the following
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that one of the following holds.
(H1) (2.4) holds and ‖r‖∞ < γ.
(H2) (2.6) holds with some continuous, inf-compact ℓ and
lim sup
|x|→∞
maxu2∈U2 r(x,u2)
ℓ(x) ≤ θ ∈ (0, 1) . (3.1)
Then there exists (V, λmax) ∈W
2,p
loc(R
d)× R, p ∈ (1,∞), with V > 0 and
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ijV (x) + b
i(x, u˜2) ∂iV (x) + r(x, u˜2)V
)
= λmax V (x) a.e. in R
d. (3.2)
Moreover, we have the following:
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(i) For all x ∈ Rd, we have
λmax = sup
U2∈U2
Ex(r, U
2) = sup
U2∈U2
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
logEx
[
e
∫ T
0
r(Xs,U2s ) ds
]
.
(ii) Any measurable selector of (3.2) is an optimal stationary Markov control, i.e., if v∗2
is a measurable maximizer of (3.2) then we have λmax = Ex(r, v
∗
2).
(iii) The solution of (3.2) is unique in the class W2,ploc(R
d), p ∈ (1,∞), provided V (0) = 1.
(iv) Any optimal stationary Markov control is a measurable selector of (3.2).
A similar minimization problem with long-run average of risk sensitive cost has been
studied in [3, Theorem 4.1 and 4.2]. As we mentioned earlier it is not obvious that one
can change a maximization problem to a minimization problem of same type. Therefore
proof Theorem 3.1 does not follow from [3]. We think Theorem 3.1 would be of independent
interest. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is divided in several lemmas.
In what follows Bn denotes the open ball of radius n around 0. Following result follows
from [32, Theorem 1.1 and Remark 3]
Lemma 3.1. There exists a (unique) positive ϕn ∈ W
2,p
loc(Bn) ∩ C(B¯n), p ∈ (1,∞), and
αn ∈ R such that ϕn(0) = 1 and
max
u˜∈U˜2
(
Lu˜2ϕn + r(x, u˜2)ϕn
)
= αn ϕn(x), a.e. in Bn, ϕn = 0, on ∂Bn. (3.3)
Moreover, αn < αn+1 for all n ∈ N.
Let v∗2,n be a measurable selector of (3.3). Then
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ijϕn(x) + b
i(x, v∗2,n) ∂iϕn(x) + r(x, v
∗
2,n)ϕn = αn ϕn, a.e. in Bn. (3.4)
Since ϕn(0) = 1, by Harnack’s inequality [22, Corollary 9.25] and (3.4) we have for any
compact set K ⊂ Bn,
sup
K
ϕn ≤ C(K), (3.5)
for some constant C(K), not depending on n but depends on K and the constants in (A1)-
(A3). Therefore using standard Sobolev estimate [22, Theorem 9.11] in (3.4) we obtain {ϕn :
n ≥ 1} uniformly bounded in W2,p(K), p > d. By a standard diagonalization argument we
can extract a subsequence of {ϕn : n ≥ 1} that converges to some V ∈ W
2,p
loc(R
d), p > 1,
strongly in C1,αloc (R
d), α ∈ (0, 1), and weakly in W2,ploc(R
d), p > 1. Therefore we have the
following lemma
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that either (H1) or (H2) of Theorem 3.1 holds. Then the sequence
{αn : n ≥ 1} is bounded above. Moreover, if (V, λmax) is any sub-sequential limit of
(ϕn, αn), then we have
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(
Lu˜2V (x) + r(x, u˜2)V (x)
)
= λmax V (x), a.e. in R
d, and V > 0. (3.6)
Proof. Let us first show that {αn} is bounded above. Let v
∗
2,n be a measurable selector
of (3.3). Extend the Markov control in Rd be settings v∗2,n(x) = u2 for all x ∈ B
c
n where
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u2 ∈ U˜2 is fixed. Let τn = τ(Bn). Then appying Itoˆ-Krylov formula [29, p. 122] to (3.4) we
have, for x ∈ B1
ϕn(x) = E
v∗2,n
x
[
e
∫ T
0 [r(Xs,v
∗
2,n(Xs))−αn] dsϕn(XT )1{T<τn}
]
≤ ‖ϕn‖∞ E
v∗2,n
x
[
e
∫ T
0
[r(Xs,v∗2,n(Xs))−αn] ds
]
.
Therefore taking logarithm on both sides, diving by T and letting T →∞ we get
αn ≤ Ex(r, v
∗
2,n). (3.7)
Under condition (H1) we have r bounded and thus
sup
U2∈U2
Ex(r, U
2) ≤ ‖r‖∞ <∞.
Suppose condition (H2) holds. It is easy to see from (2.6) that
sup
U2∈U2
Ex(ℓ, U
2) ≤ βminK V .
By (3.1), max
u˜2∈U˜2
r(·, u˜2) ≤ κ+ ℓ(·) for some positive κ. Hence
sup
U2∈U2
Ex(r, U
2) ≤ κ+ βminK V .
Combining these with (3.7) we have
αn ≤ κ1, for all n ≥ 1, and for some constant κ1. (3.8)
Hence first part of the lemma follows from (3.8).
Since {αn : n ≥ 1} is bounded above, λmax = limn→∞ αn exists. Let V be a sub-
sequential limit of ϕn as obtained above. Since ϕn → V in C
1,α
loc (R
d) we have, for any
compact set K,
sup
x∈K
∣∣∣max
u˜2∈U˜2
(b(x, u˜2) ·∇ϕn(x)+r(x, u˜2)ϕn(x))− max
u˜2∈U˜2
(b(x, u˜2) ·∇V (x)+r(x, u˜2)V (x))
∣∣∣ (3.9)
tending to 0, as n → ∞. Now let χ be a smooth function with compact support. Then
using the observation in (3.9) and using (3.3) we obtain, as n→∞,
1
2
∫
Rd
aij(x)∂ijV (x)χ(x) dx+
∫
Rd
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(b(x, u˜2) · ∇V (x) + r(x, u˜2)V (x))χ(x) dx
= λmax
∫
Rd
V (x)χ(x) dx. (3.10)
Since χ is arbitrary and V ∈W2,ploc(R
d), p > 1, (3.10) implies that
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(
Lu˜2V (x) + r(x, u˜2)V (x)
)
= λmax V (x), a.e. in R
d.
It is easy to see that V ≥ 0 and V (0) = 1. Therefore by an application of Harnack’s
inequality in the above equation we get V > 0 in Rd. Hence the proof. 
Next we show that V has a stochastic representation.
ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME WITH RISK-SENSITIVE COST 11
Lemma 3.3. Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 hold. Then for any sub-sequential
limit V , as obtained in Lemma 3.2, there exists a compact set B such that for any measurable
selector v∗2 of (3.6) and any compact ball B1 ⊃ B we have
V (x) = E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax] dsV (Xτ˘1)
]
, for x ∈ Bc1, (3.11)
where τ˘1 = τ(B
c
1).
Proof. Let us first argue that λmax is non-negative. If not, let us assume that λmax < 0.
Let v∗2 be a measurable selector of (3.6). Existence of such a measurable selector is assured
by [1, Theorem 18.13]. Thus we have
Lv∗2V (x) + r(x, v
∗
2(x))V (x) = λmaxV (x), a.e. in R
d. (3.12)
Applying Itoˆ-Krylov formula [29, p. 122] to (3.12) we obtain for any T > 0 and for any n,
that
V (x) = E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫ τ(Bc1)∧T∧τn
0 [r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax] dsV (X
τ(Bc1)∧T∧τn
)
]
, for x ∈ Bc1. (3.13)
Letting T →∞, and n→∞ in (3.13) and applying Fatou’s lemma twice we get
V (x) ≥ E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫ τ(Bc1)
0 [r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax] dsV (X
τ(Bc1)
)
]
≥ min
B¯1
V,
where we have used the fact (r − λmax) ≥ 0 which follows from the fact that r ≥ 0 and
λmax < 0. Therefore we have minRd V > 0. Again a further application of Itoˆ-Krylov
formula [29, p. 122] to (3.12), followed by Fatou’s lemma, gives us
V (x) ≥ E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫ T
0 [r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax] dsV (XT )
]
≥ min
Rd
V E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫ T
0 [r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax] ds
]
.
Now taking logarithm on both sides, diving by T and letting T →∞ we obtain
λmax ≥ Ex(r, v
∗
2) ≥ 0.
But this is contradicting the fact that λmax < 0. Hence we have λmax ≥ 0.
First we note that there exists a compact set B and θˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that under (H1)(
max
u∈U2
r(x, u)− λmax
)
< θˆ γ, for all x ∈ Bc, (3.14)
and under condition (H2),(
max
u∈U2
r(x, u)− λmax
)
< θˆ ℓ(x), for all x ∈ Bc. (3.15)
(3.14) follows from the fact 0 ≤ λmax ≤ ‖r‖∞ < γ whereas (3.15) follows from (3.1). Since
αn → λmax it is easy to see that we can find θˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that (3.14) (and (3.15)) holds
true when λmax is replaced by αn for all large n. Let τ˘ denote the hitting time to B. Without
loss of generality we may assume B ⊃ K where K is same as in (2.4) and (2.6). We give
the proof using (3.14), and the proof using (3.15) follows by repeating the same argument.
ϕn being positive we note that αn is the principal eigenvalue of the elliptic operator on the
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LHS of (3.4). Thus using (3.4) and stochastic representation from [2, Lemma 2.10(i)] we
have, for x ∈ Bc and B ⊂ Bn, for all n sufficiently large
ϕn(x) = E
v∗2,n
x
[
e
∫
τ˘
0
[r(Xs,v∗2,n(Xs))−αn] dsϕn(Xτ˘1)1{τ˘<τn}
]
≤ sup
B
ϕn E
v∗2,n
x
[
eθˆγτ˘
]
≤ sup
B
ϕn
(
E
v∗2,n
x
[
eγτ˘
])θˆ
≤ sup
B
ϕn
1
minB V θˆ
(
E
v∗2,n
x
[
eγτ˘V(X
τ˘
)
])θˆ
≤ κ2 (V(x))
θˆ, (3.16)
for some constant κ2, where the last inequality follows applying Itoˆ’s formula to (2.4). Note
that κ2 can be chosen independent of n, by (3.5) thanks to the Harnack’s inequality. Now
we proceed to show the stochastic representation (3.11). Fix the compact set B as chosen
in (3.14) and (3.15). Let B1 be a compact ball containing B and τ˘1 = τ(B
c
1). As earlier we
show (3.11) under assertion (H1) and the proof under condition (H2) would be analogous.
Applying Itoˆ-Krylov formula to (3.12) we obtain, for any T > 0,
V (x) = E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫
τ˘1∧τn∧T
0 (r(Xs,v
∗
2 (Xs))−λmax) ds V (X
τ˘1∧τn∧T )
]
, x ∈ Bc1 ∩Bn, B1 ⊂ Bn ,
(3.17)
where τn = τ(Bn) denotes the exit time from the ball Bn. Since
E
v∗2
x
[
eγτ˘1
]
< ∞, for x ∈ Bc1,
by (2.4), and V is bounded in Bc1 ∩Bn, for every fixed n, letting T →∞ in (3.17), we have
V (x) = E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫
τ˘1∧τn
0 (r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax) ds V (X
τ˘∧τn)
]
, x ∈ Bc1 ∩Bn. (3.18)
On the other hand, since
E
v∗2
x
[
eγ(τ˘1∧τn)
]
= E
v∗2
x
[
eγ τ˘1 1{τ˘1<τn}
]
+ E
v∗2
x
[
eγ τn 1{τ˘1>τn}
]
;
and by monotone convergence theorem the first two quantities converges to the same limit,
we have
E
v∗2
x
[
eγ τn 1{τ˘1>τn}
]
−−−→
n→∞
0, for x ∈ Bc1. (3.19)
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We denote by Γ(n,m) = {x ∈ ∂Bn : V (x) ≥ m} for m ≥ 1. Then using (3.19)
E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫
τn
0 (r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax) ds V (Xτn)1{τn<τ˘1}
]
≤ m Ev
∗
x
[
eγ τn 1{τn<τ˘1}
]
+ Ev
∗
x
[
eγ τn V (Xτn)1{x∈Γ(n,m)}1{τn<τ˘1}
]
≤ m Ev
∗
x
[
eγ τn 1{τn<τ˘1}
]
+ κ2 E
v∗
x
[
eγ τn (V(Xτn))
θˆ
1{x∈Γ(n,m)}1{τn<τ˘1}
]
≤ m Ev
∗
x
[
eγ τn 1{τn<τ˘1}
]
+ κ2
[m
κ2
] θˆ−1
θˆ
E
v∗
x
[
eγ τn V(Xτn)1{τn<τ˘1}
]
≤ m Ev
∗
x
[
eγ τn 1{τn<τ˘1}
]
+ κ2
[m
κ2
] θˆ−1
θˆ V(x)
−→ 0 ,
by letting n → ∞ first and then letting m → ∞. Therefore letting n → ∞ in (3.18) we
have (3.11). Note that under (H2) in order to make analogous argument we use the fact
that
E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 ℓ(Xt)dt
]
< ∞, for x ∈ Bc1,
by (2.6). 
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1. The idea of the proof is the following : First
we perturb the cost to a norm-like cost and prove Theorem 3.1 for the perturbed ver-
sion. Then passing to the limit we show that the limiting eigenfunction also has stochastic
representation (3.11) and we use Lemma 3.3 as a key ingredient in proving the result.
Let us now introduce the perturbation of r, denoted by rm. Form ∈ N, let ζm : R
d → [0, 1]
be a smooth function and satisfy ζm(x) = 1 in Bm, ζm(x) = 0 in B
c
m+1. For (H1), we choose
δ small enough that so that ‖r‖∞ + δ < γ and define
rm(x, u˜2) = ζm(x)r(x, u2) + (1− ζm(x))(‖r‖∞ + δ), u2 ∈ U2.
For (H2), we define
rm(x, u˜2) = r(x, u2) +
1
m
ℓ(x), u2 ∈ U2.
Choose m large enough so that rm satisfies (3.1). Note that rm is locally finite, continuous
in u˜2 for every fixed x. Also Lemma 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 holds with r replaced by rm. Thus we
can find an eigenpair (Vm, λ2,m) ∈W
2,p
loc(R
d)× R, Vm > 0, and
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(
Lu˜2Vm(x) + rm(x, u˜2)Vm(x)
)
= λ2,m Vm(x), a.e. in R
d. (3.20)
Lemma 3.4. The solution Vm of (3.20) is bounded from below i.e., minRd Vm > 0. More-
over, for all x ∈ Rd,
sup
U2∈U2
Ex(rm, U
2) = λ2,m. (3.21)
Proof. Fix m. We claim that there exists a compact set K such that minu2∈U2 rm(x, u2)−
λ2,m ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K
c. This obvious when rm is unbounded, as defined under condition
(H2). Thus we prove the claim under condition (H1) where rm is bounded. Note that rm =
‖r‖∞ + δ for x ∈ B
c
m+1. Let v
∗
2,m be a measurable selector of (3.20). Then by Lemma 3.3,
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Vm has stochastic representation with some compact ball B1 and running cost rm. From [3,
Corollary 2.3] we know that only principal eigenvalue of the associated operator can have
such representation. Therefore combing with Lemma 2.1 we get λ2,m = Ex(rm, v
∗
2,m) for all
x. Again by strict monotonicity of principal eigenvalue [3, Theorem 3.3] under condition
(H1) we have λ2,m < ‖r‖∞ + δ. Therefore choosing K = B¯m+1 we have our claim.
Without loss of generality we can choose K large enough to contain B where B is given
by Lemma 3.3. Let τ˘K be the hitting time to K. Hence by (3.11)
Vm(x) = E
v∗2,m
x
[
e
∫
τ˘K
0 [rm(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λ2,m] dsVm(Xτ˘K )
]
≥ min
K
Vm, ∀x ∈ K
c.
This proves that minRd Vm = minK Vm > 0 (This is the key reason to perturb r by rm).
This proves first part of the lemma. To prove the second part consider U2 ∈ U2. Using
(3.20) and Itoˆ-Krylov formula [29, p. 122] we obtain
Vm(x) ≥ Ex
[
e
∫ T
0 [rm(Xs,U
2(Xs))−λ2,m] dsVm(XT )
]
≥ min
Rd
Vm Ex
[
e
∫ T
0 [rm(Xs,U
2(Xs))−λ2,m] ds
]
.
Taking logarithm on both sides, dividing by T and letting T →∞, we get
Ex(rm, U
2) ≤ λ2,m.
U2 in U2 being arbitrary we have (3.21), using the above display and the fact λ2,m =
Ex(rm, v
∗
2,m). 
Let us fix Vm(0) = 1. Recall that v
∗
2,m is a measurable selector of (3.20) i.e.
Lv∗2,mVm(x) + rm(x, v
∗
2.m)Vm(x) = λ2,m Vm(x), a.e. in R
d. (3.22)
Therefore applying Harnack’s inequality and Sobolev estimate, as earlier, on (3.22) it is
easy to see that the sequence {Vm} is uniformly bounded in W
2,p
loc(R
d), p > 1. Therefore we
can extract a sub-sequence of {Vm} that converges to some V ∈W
2,p
loc(R
d), p > 1, weakly in
W
2,p
loc(R
d), p > 1, and strongly in C1,αloc (R
d), α ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand {λ2,m : m ≥ 1}
is also a bounded sequence. This follows from (3.21) and by a similar reasoning as in
Lemma 3.2. Let (V, λmax) be a sub-sequence of (Vm, λ2,m) as m→∞. Then following the
arguments of Lemma 3.2 we obtain
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(
Lu˜2V (x) + r(x, u˜2)V (x)
)
= λmax V (x), a.e. in R
d.
Again the arguments of Lemma 3.3 shows that Vm(x) ≤ κ2(V(x))
θˆ , θˆ ∈ (0, 1), uniformly in
m outside a compact set (see (3.16)) and therefore, by an analogous calculation the limit
V also has stochastic representation. Summarizing we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 hold. There exists an eigenpair (V, λmax) ∈
W
2,p
loc(R
d)×R, p ∈ (1,∞), such that V > 0, and
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ijV (x) + b
i(x, u˜2) ∂iV (x) + r(x, u˜2)V
)
= λmax V (x) a.e. in R
d. (3.23)
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There exists a compact set B such that for any measurable selector v∗2 of (3.23) and any
compact ball B1 ⊃ B we have
V (x) = E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax] dsV (X
τ˘1
)
]
, for x ∈ Bc1, (3.24)
where τ˘1 = τ(B
c
1). Moreover, for all x ∈ R
d,
λmax = sup
U2∈U2
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
logEx
[
e
∫ T
0
r(Xs,U2s ) ds
]
,
and any measurable selector of (3.23) is an optimal stationary Markov control.
Proof. Select (V, λmax) as a sub-sequential limit of (Vm, λ2,m). Then from the discussion
preceding Lemma 3.5 we see that (3.23) and (3.24) hold. Also from the construction of rm
we have rm ≥ r for all (x, u˜2) ∈ R
d × U˜. Therefore by (3.21) we have
sup
U2∈U2
Ex(r, U
2) ≤ λmax, for all x ∈ R
d. (3.25)
Let v∗2 be a measurable selector of (3.23) i.e.,(
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ijV (x) + b
i(x, v∗2) ∂iV (x) + r(x, v
∗
2)V
)
= λmax V (x). (3.26)
By [3, Corollary 2.3] only principal eigenvalue of the elliptic operator in (3.26) can have
such stochastic representation (3.24). Combining this with Lemma 2.1 we note that λmax =
Ex(r, v
∗
2) for all x. Thus by (3.25),
sup
U2∈U2
Ex(r, U
2) = λmax, for all x ∈ R
d,
and v∗2 is an optimal stationary Markov control. 
Let us now prove Theorem 3.1
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (i) and (ii) follows from Lemma 3.5. So we need to prove (iii) and
(iv). To prove (iii) we assume that there exists positive V̂ ∈ W2,ploc(R
d), p ∈ (1,∞), that
satisfies
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ij V̂ (x) + b
i(x, u˜2) ∂iV̂ (x) + r(x, u˜2)V̂
)
= λmax V̂ (x) a.e. in R
d. (3.27)
Let v∗2 be a measurable selector of (3.23). Using (3.27)
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ij V̂ (x) + b
i(x, v∗2) ∂iV̂ (x) + r(x, v
∗
2)V̂ ≤ λmax V̂ (x) a.e. in R
d. (3.28)
Applying Itoˆ-Krylov formula to (3.28), with the same compact ball B1 as in (3.24), we
obtain, for x ∈ Bc1,
V̂ (x) ≥ E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax ] dsV̂ (Xτ˘1)
]
. (3.29)
Using (3.24) and (3.29) one has
V̂ (x)− V (x) ≥ E
v∗2
x
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [r(Xs,v
∗
2(Xs))−λmax] ds
(
V̂ (Xτ˘1)− V (Xτ˘1)
)]
.
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Therefore if we multiply V by a suitable positive constant so that V̂ − V is non-negative in
B1 and has its minimum 0 in B1, the above display indicates that V̂ − V ≥ 0 in R
d with
its minimum in B1. On the other hand by (3.26) and (3.28) one has
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ij(V̂ − V ) + b
i(x, v∗2) ∂i(V̂ − V ) − (r(x, v
∗
2)− λmax)
−(V̂ − V )
≤ −(r(x, v∗2)− λmax)
+ (V̂ − V )
≤ 0.
Hence applying strong maximum principle [22, Theorem 9.6] one has V = V̂ . This proves
uniqueness.
Let us now prove (iv). Suppose v˜ is an optimal stationary Markov control, i.e., Ex(r, v˜) =
λmax. By [3, Theorem 3.2 and 3.3] there exists positive V˜ ∈W
2,p
loc(R
d), p > 1, such that
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ij V˜ (x) + b
i(x, v˜) ∂iV˜ (x) + r(x, v˜)V˜ = λmaxV˜, (3.30)
and λmax = Ex(r, v˜) for all x ∈ R
d. Moreover V˜ will have stochastic representation with
respect to some compact ball B. Now (3.23) gives
1
2 a
ij(x) ∂ijV (x) + b
i(x, v˜) ∂iV (x) + r(x, v˜)V ≤ λmax V. (3.31)
Applying Itoˆ-Krylov formula we also have
V˜ (x) = Ev˜x
[
e
∫
τ˘
0
[r(Xs,v˜(Xs))−λmax] dsV˜ (Xτ˘)
]
,
V (x) ≥ Ev˜x
[
e
∫
τ˘
0
[r(Xs,v˜(Xs))−λmax] dsV (Xτ˘)
]
.
Therefore with the help of these stochastic representations and (3.30)-(3.31) we can follow
the same argument as above (for uniqueness) to conclude that V = V˜ . Thus the inequality
in (3.31) is in fact an equality and v˜ is a measurable selector of (3.23). Hence the proof. 
4. Proof of the Theorem 2.1
In this section we prove Theorem 2.1. The proof is divided into several lemmas. All the
results in this section are valid under any one of the Conditions 2.1 and 2.2. Recall that Bn
denotes the open ball of radius n around 0. By S we denote the set of all real symmetric
matrices. Let F : S× Rd × R× Rd → R be defined as follows
F (M,p, v, x) = max
u˜2∈U˜2
min
u˜1∈U˜1
(1
2
aij(x)M ij + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · p+ c(x, u˜1, u˜2)v
)
.
Note that F is linear in M when other variables are kept fixed. Then by [5, Theorem 2.2],
[25] there exists an (unique) eigenpair (ψn, λn) ∈ C
1,α
loc (Bn) ∩ C(B¯n)× R with ψn > 0, such
that
F (D2ψn,Dψn, ψn, x) = λnψn, in Bn, and ψn = 0 on ∂Bn. (4.1)
The above should be understood in the sense of viscosity solution. From the structure of F
it easy to see that ψn is a viscosity solution of
1
2
aij(x)∂ijΨ = f(x),
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where
f(x) := − max
u˜2∈U˜2
min
u˜1∈U˜1
(
b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇ψn(x) + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)ψn(x)
)
+ λnψn(x),
is locally Ho¨lder continuous in Bn. Therefore using (A1), (A3) and [16, Theorem 3] we get
ψn ∈ C
2,α
loc (Bn) for some α > 0. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that either Condition 2.1 or Condition 2.2 holds. For every n ∈ N
there exists an eigenpair (ψn, λn) ∈ C
2(Bn) ∩ C(B¯n) × R with ψn > 0 satisfying (4.1).
Moreover, the set {λn : n ∈ N} is bounded.
Proof. In view of the discussion above we only need to show that {λn : n ∈ N} is a bounded
set. Note that by [19, Theorem 3]
max
u˜2∈U˜2
min
u˜1∈U˜1
(1
2
aij(x)∂ijψn(x) + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇ψn(x) + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)ψn(x)
)
= min
u˜1∈U˜1
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(1
2
aij(x)∂ijψn(x) + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇ψn(x) + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)ψn(x)
)
.
Let vn2 be a outer maximizing selector of the LHS above and v
n
1 be a outer minimizing
selector of RHS above. It is easy to check that
1
2
aij(x)∂ijψn(x) + b(x, v
n
1 , v
n
2 ) · ∇ψn(x) + c(x, v
n
1 , v
n
2 )ψn(x) = λnψn(x). (4.2)
Extend the Markov controls in Rd by setting vn1 (x) = u1 and v
n
2 (x) = u2 for all x ∈ B
c
n
where (u1, u2) ∈ U˜1 × U˜2 is fixed. Let τn = τ(Bn). Then appying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.2) we
have, for x ∈ Bn and v
n = (vn1 , v
n
2 ),
ψn(x) = E
v
x
[
e
∫ T
0 [c(Xs,v
n
1 (Xs),v
n
2 (Xs))−λn] dsψn(XT )1{T<τn}
]
≤ ‖ψn‖∞ E
v
x
[
e
∫ T
0 [c(Xs,v
n
1 (Xs),v
n
2 (Xs))−λn] ds
]
.
Therefore taking logarithm on both sides, diving by T and letting T →∞, we get
λn ≤ Ex(v
n
1 , v
n
2 ). (4.3)
Under Condition 2.1 we have c bounded and thus
sup
(U1,U2)∈U1×U2
Ex(U
1, U2) ≤ ‖c‖∞ <∞.
Suppose Condition 2.2 holds. It is easy to see from (2.6) that
sup
(U1,U2)∈U1×U2
Ex(ℓ, U
1, U2) ≤ βminK V .
Since c ∈ Cℓ, maxu∈U1×U2 c(·, u) ≤ κ+ ℓ(·) for some positive κ. Hence
sup
(U1,U2)∈U1×U2
Ex(c, U
1, U2) ≤ κ+ βminK V .
Combining these with (4.3) we have
λn ≤ κ1, for all n ≥ 1, and for some constant κ1. (4.4)
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Thus it remains to show that the set {λn : n ∈ N} is also bounded from below. We define
the elliptic operator Ln as
Lnϕ =
1
2
aij(x)∂ijϕ(x) + b(x, v
n
1 , v
n
2 ) · ∇ϕ(x) + c(x, v
n
1 , v
n
2 )ϕ(x).
Then from (4.2) we see that (ψn, λn) is the principal eigenpair of L
n for the Dirichlet problem
in Bn. If λˆ
n denote the principal eigenvalue of Ln in B1 then by monotonicity property
of principal eigenvalues (with respect to domains ordered with respect to set inclusion, see
for instance [9]) we know that λn ≥ λˆ
n. On the other hand by [32, Proposition 4.1] there
exists a constant κ0, independent of n, such that λˆ
n ≥ κ0. Thus λn ≥ κ0 for all n. This
completes the proof combining with (4.4). 
Set ψn(0) = 1. Then by Harnack’s inequality [22, Corollary 9.25] and (4.2) we have for
any compact set K ⊂ Bn, {ψn : n ≥ 1} uniformly bounded in W
2,p(K), p > d (see (3.5)).
By a standard diagonalization argument we can extract a subsequence of {ψn : n ≥ 1}
that converges to some V ∈ W2,ploc(R
d), p > 1, strongly in C1,αloc (R
d), α ∈ (0, 1), and weakly
in W2,ploc(R
d), p > 1.
Lemma 4.2. If (V,Λ) is any sub-sequential limit of (ψn, λn), as obtained above, then we
have V ∈ C2(Rd) and
max
u˜2∈U˜2
min
u˜1∈U˜1
(1
2
aij(x)∂ijV (x) + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇V (x) + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)V (x)
)
= ΛV (x), V > 0.
(4.5)
Moreover,
Λ ≤ Λ = sup
U2∈U2
Jinf(x,U
2) = sup
U2∈U2
inf
U1∈U1
Ex(U
1, U2). (4.6)
Proof. Since ψn converges to V along some subsequence, strongly in C
1,α
loc (R
d), α ∈ (0, 1),
and weakly in W2,ploc(R
d), p > 1, we can pass limit in (4.1) to obtain (4.5). Regularity of
V can be improved to C2(Rd) using ellipticity of a, (A1) and standard elliptic regularity
estimates. Now fix x ∈ Rd and choose n large enough so that x ∈ Bn. Recall the outer
maximizing selector vn2 from Lemma 4.1. Then for any U
1 ∈ U1 we have(1
2
aij(Xs)∂ijψn(Xs)+b(Xs, U
1
s , v
n
2 (Xs))·∇ψn(Xs)+c(Xs, U
1
s , v
n
2 (Xs))ψn(Xs)
)
≥ λn ψn(Xs),
almost surely for s < τn. Thus following a similar calculation as in Lemma 4.1 (see (4.3))
we obtain
λn ≤ Ex(v
n
2 , U
1).
Since U1 has been chosen arbitrarily we get λn ≤ infU1∈U1 Ex(v
n
2 , U
1) = Jinf(x, v
n
2 ) ≤ Λ.
Now let n→∞ to obtain (4.6). 
Following result shows that Λ, obtained in Lemma 4.2, is actually value of the game.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that either Condition 2.1 or Condition 2.2 holds. Let (V,Λ) ∈
C2(Rd)× R be the eigenpair obtained in Lemma 4.2. Then we have
Λ¯ = inf
U1∈U1
Jsup(x,U
1) = inf
U1∈U1
sup
U2∈U2
Ex(U
1, U2) ≤ Λ. (4.7)
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Thus we have Λ¯ = Λ = Λ for all x ∈ Rd.
Proof. Fix an outer minimizer v∗1 of (4.5) and consider the maximization problem with
r(x, u˜2) = c(x, v
∗
1(x), u˜2)
maximize Ex(r, U
2), over U2.
From Theroem 3.1 we know that there exists a stationary Markov control w∗2 which is
optimal for the above maximization problem. Moreover, if λmax is the maximum value we
have λmax = Ex(c, v
∗
1 , w
∗
2) for all x. On the other hand from (4.5) we have
1
2
aij(x)∂ijV (x) + b(x, v
∗
1 , w
∗
2) · ∇V (x) + c(x, v
∗
1 , w
∗
2)V (x)
≤ max
u˜2∈U˜
(1
2
aij(x)∂ijV (x) + b(x, v
∗
1 , u˜2) · ∇V (x) + c(x, v
∗
1 , u˜2)V (x)
)
= min
u˜1∈U˜
max
u˜2∈U˜
(1
2
aij(x)∂ijV (x) + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇V (x) + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)V (x)
)
= ΛV (x) .
Therefore by the definition of principal eigenvalue (2.10) we see that Λ is bigger than
the principal eigenvalue of L(v∗1 ,w∗2) + c(x, v
∗
1 , w
∗
2). Combining with Lemma 2.1 we have
Ex(c, v
∗
1 , w
∗
2) ≤ Λ. Thus
Λ ≥ sup
U2∈U2
Ex(v
∗
1 , U
2) ≥ inf
U1∈U1
Jsup(x,U
1) = Λ¯. (4.8)
This proves (4.7). Since Λ ≤ Λ¯ in general, it follows from Lemma 4.2 that Λ¯ = Λ = Λ for
all x ∈ Rd. 
Now onwards we fix an outer maximizing strategy v∗2 and outer minimizing strategy v
∗
1 of
(4.5). Let us now show that the value Λ is achieved by applying the strategy v∗ = (v∗1 , v
∗
2).
Lemma 4.4. Suppose that either Condition 2.1 or Condition 2.2 holds. Let (V,Λ) be an
eigenpair obtained in Lemma 4.2. Then we have a compact ball B such that for any compact
ball B1 ⊃ B we have
V (x) = Ev
∗
x
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [c(Xs,v
∗
1 (Xs),v
∗
2 (Xs))−Λ] dsV (X
τ˘1
)
]
, for x ∈ Bc1,
where τ˘1 = τ(B
c
1).Moreover, Λ = Ex(v
∗
1 , v
∗
2).
Proof. From (4.5) we have
1
2
aij(x)∂ijV + b(x, v
∗
1 , v
∗
2) · ∇V + c(x, v
∗
1 , v
∗
2)V = ΛV. (4.9)
Then following the calculations of Lemma 3.3, we can find a compact set B such that for
any compact ball B1 ⊃ B we have
V (x) = Ev
∗
x
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [c(Xs,v
∗
1 (Xs),v
∗
2 (Xs))−Λ] dsV (X
τ˘1
)
]
, for x ∈ Bc1, (4.10)
where τ˘1 = τ(B
c
1). But (4.10) is known as the stochastic representation of V , and therefore
by [3, Corollary 2.3] Λ is the principal eigenvalue of the elliptic operator (4.9) in Rd. Hence,
by Lemma 2.1, Λ = Ex(v
∗
1 , v
∗
2) for all x ∈ R
d. 
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Thus so far we have shown that the game has a value Λ, and the value is attained by the
strategy (v∗1 , v
∗
2). Let us now show that (v
∗
1 , v
∗
2) is in fact a saddle point strategy.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose that either Condition 2.1 or Condition 2.2 holds. Let (v∗1 , v
∗
2) be
same as we have chosen in Lemma 4.4. Then we have for all x ∈ Rd,
Ex(v
∗
1 , U
2) ≤ E(v∗1 , v
∗
2) ≤ Ex(U
1, v∗2), ∀ U
1 ∈ U1, and U
2 ∈ U2. (4.11)
In other words, (v∗1 , v
∗
2) is a saddle point strategy.
Proof. The first inequality in (4.11) follows from (4.8). So we only prove the second in-
equality. Let us first show that for any stationary Markov control v : Rd → U˜1 we have
E(v∗1 , v
∗
2) ≤ E(v, v
∗
2). (4.12)
The proof of (4.12) is based on the method of contradiction. Suppose that Λ = E(v∗1 , v
∗
2) >
E(v, v∗2) = λv. Then following the same argument as in [3, Theorem 4.1 and 4.2] (see also
Section 3) we can find a positive eigenfunction V̂ ∈W2,ploc(R
d), p > 1, such that(1
2
aij∂ij V̂ + b(x, v, v
∗
2) · ∇V̂ + c(x, v, v
∗
2)V̂
)
= λvV̂ , (4.13)
and for a suitable compact set B we have for B1 ⊃ B hitting time τ˘1
V̂ (x) = Evˆx
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [c(Xs,vˆ(Xs))−λv ] dsV̂ (Xτ˘1)
]
, for x ∈ Bc1, vˆ = (v, v
∗
2). (4.14)
This can be obtained by a similar argument as in Lemma 3.3. On the other hand we have
from (4.5) that (1
2
aij∂ijV + b(x, v, v
∗
2) · ∇V + c(x, v, v
∗
2)V
)
≥ ΛV. (4.15)
Using the stochastic representation in Lemma 4.4 we find that for some constants κ2, θˆ ∈
(0, 1), V (x) ≤ κ (V(x))θˆ . Therefore following a similar calculation as in Lemma 3.3 and
using (4.15) we obtain
V (x) ≤ Ex
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [c(Xs,v,v
∗
2 )−Λ] dsV (X
τ˘1
)
]
, for x ∈ Bc1, (4.16)
for some large compact ball B1. Since Λ > λv we have from (4.14) and (4.16) that for
x ∈ Bc1,
V̂ (x)− V (x) ≥ Ex
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [c(Xs,v,v
∗
2 )−λv] dsV̂ (X
τ˘1
)
]
− Ex
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [c(Xs,v,v
∗
2)−Λ] dsV (X
τ˘1
)
]
≥ Ex
[
e
∫
τ˘1
0 [c(Xs,v,v
∗
2 )−Λ] ds
(
V̂ (X
τ˘1
)− V (X
τ˘1
)
)]
.
Hence we can multiply V by a suitable positive constant so that V̂ −V ≥ 0 and attends its
minimum 0 in B1. Moreover, from (4.13) and (4.15) we also have(1
2
aij∂ij(V̂ − V ) + b(x, v, v
∗
2) · ∇(V̂ − V )− (c(x, v, v
∗
2)− λv)
−(V̂ − V )
)
≤ −(c(x, v, v∗2)− λv)
+(V̂ − V )− (Λ− λv)V
≤ 0.
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Thus by strong maximum principle [22, Theorem 9.6] we should have V = V̂ which would
lead to λv ≥ Λ from (4.13) and (4.15). This is a contradiction. Hence we have (4.12).
Now to compete the proof of (4.11) we consider the following minimization problem
inf
U1∈U1
E(U1, v∗2).
But this problem has a minimizer in the class of stationary Markov controls. This can be
seen mimicking the arguments of [3, Theorem 4.1 and 4.2] for measurable cost functions
(see also Section 3 for a similar argument). Then the second inequality in (4.11) follows
from (4.12). 
Now we are ready to prove the uniqueness of the value function.
Lemma 4.6. Let Λ be the value of the game, as obtained above. Then there exists a unique
V ∈ C2(Rd) that satisfies (4.5) with V (0) = 1.
Proof. Suppose that V˜ ∈ C2(Rd) is another solution to
min
u˜1∈U˜1
max
u˜2∈U˜2
(1
2
aij∂ijV˜ + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇V˜ + c(x, v1, v2)V˜
)
= max
u˜2∈U˜2
min
u˜1∈U˜1
(1
2
aij∂ijV˜ + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇V˜ + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)V˜
)
= ΛV˜. (4.17)
Let v˜∗1 be an outer minimizing selector of (4.17). Recall v
∗
2 from Lemma 4.4. Then we have
from (4.17) that(1
2
aij∂ij V˜ + b(x, v˜
∗
1 , v
∗
2) · ∇V˜ + c(x, v˜
∗
1 , v
∗
2)V˜
)
≤ max
u˜2∈U˜2
(1
2
aij∂ij V˜ + b(x, v˜
∗
1 , u˜2) · ∇V˜ + c(x, v˜
∗
1 , u˜2)V˜
)
= ΛV˜ (4.18)
Let v˜∗ = (v˜∗1 , v
∗
2) and cv˜∗ = c(x, v˜
∗
1(x), v
∗
2(x)). Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.18) and then
Fatou’s lemma we have for any closed ball B
V˜ (x) ≥ Ev˜
∗
x
[
e
∫
τ˘
0 [cv˜∗(Xs)−Λ] dsV˜ (X
τ˘
)
]
, for x ∈ Bc. (4.19)
On the other hand from (4.5) we get(1
2
aij∂ijV + b(x, v˜
∗
1 , v
∗
2) · ∇V + c(x, v˜
∗
1 , v
∗
2)V
)
≥ min
u˜1∈U˜1
(1
2
aij∂ijV + b(x, u˜1, v
∗
2) · ∇V + c(x, u˜1, v
∗
2)V
)
= max
u˜2∈U˜2
min
u˜1∈U˜1
(1
2
aij∂ijV + b(x, u˜1, u˜2) · ∇V + c(x, u˜1, u˜2)V
)
= ΛV (4.20)
Since V ≤ κ2(V)
θˆ by Lemma 4.4, applying Itoˆ’s formula as before (see Lemma 3.3) to (4.20)
we obtain, for a suitable closed ball B,
V (x) ≤ Ev˜
∗
x
[
e
∫
τ˘
0
[cv˜∗(Xs)−Λ] dsV (Xτ˘)
]
, for x ∈ Bc. (4.21)
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Now use (4.19) and (4.21), scale V by multiplying a suitable positive constant, so that
V˜ − V ≥ 0 and it attains its minimum 0 in B. Again from (4.18) and (4.20) we have(1
2
aij∂ij(V˜ − V ) + b(x, v˜
∗
1 , v
∗
2) · ∇(V˜ − V )− (cv˜∗(x)− Λ)
−(V˜ − V )
)
≤ −(cv˜∗(x)− Λ)
+(V˜ − V )
≤ 0.
Applying strong maximum principle [22, Theorem 9.6] we have V = V˜ . Hence the proof. 
Finally we are left with proving the verification result for saddle point strategy.
Lemma 4.7. Suppose that either Condition 2.1 or Condition 2.2 holds. Consider a sta-
tionary Markov control pair (vˆ1, vˆ2) ∈ U
SM
1 × U
SM
2 which is a saddle point strategy i.e.,
E(vˆ1, vˆ2) ≤ E(U
1, vˆ2), for all U
1 ∈ U1,
E(vˆ1, vˆ2) ≥ E(vˆ1, U
2), for all U2 ∈ U2.
Then vˆ1 is an outer minimizing selector of (2.9), and vˆ2 is an outer maximizing selector of
(2.8).
Proof. Since
Λ = inf
U1∈U1
Jsup(x,U
1) ≤ sup
U2∈U2
Ex(vˆ1, U
2)
≤ Ex(vˆ1, vˆ2) ≤ inf
U1∈U1
Ex(U
1, vˆ2) ≤ sup
U2∈U2
Jinf(x,U
2) = Λ,
we have E(vˆ1, vˆ2) = Λ. We give the proof under Condition 2.1 and proof with the other
condition is analogous. So we assume that Condition 2.1 holds. We give the proof for the
first situation and proof for the other situation would be analogous. Therefore we show
that vˆ2 is an outer maximizing selector of (2.8). Fix vˆ2 and consider the cost function
cˆ(x, u1) = c(x, u1, vˆ2(x)). Then from [3, Theorem 4.2] we can find V̂ ∈ W
2,p
loc(R
d) that
satisfies
min
u˜1∈U˜1
(1
2
aij∂ijV̂ + b(x, u˜1, vˆ2) · ∇V̂ + cˆ(x, u˜1)V̂
)
= ΛV̂ , (4.22)
and for some positive constant κ2, θˆ ∈ (0, 1), V̂ ≤ κ2 (V)
θˆ. Now choosing the control to v∗1
(which is same as in Lemma 4.4) we have from (4.22)(1
2
aij∂ijV̂ + b(x, v
∗
1 , vˆ2) · ∇V̂ + c(x, v
∗
1 , vˆ2)V̂
)
≥ ΛV̂ . (4.23)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.23) and following an argument similar to Lemma 3.3 we have
V̂ (x) ≤ Ex
[
e
∫
τ˘
0 [c(Xs,v
∗
1 ,u
∗
2)−Λ] dsV̂ (X
τ˘
)
]
, for x ∈ Bc, (4.24)
for some closed ball B and τ˘ = τ(Bc). On the other hand from (4.5) we have
ΛV = max
v2∈U˜
(1
2
aij∂ijV + b(x, v
∗
1 , v2) · ∇V + c(x, v
∗
1 , v2)V
)
≥
(1
2
aij∂ijV + b(x, v
∗
1 , vˆ2) · ∇V + c(x, v
∗
1 , vˆ2)V
)
, (4.25)
ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME WITH RISK-SENSITIVE COST 23
and for the same closed ball B
V (x) ≥ Ex
[
e
∫
τ˘
0 [c(Xs,v
∗
1 ,u
∗
2)−Λ] dsV (Xτ˘)
]
, for x ∈ Bc. (4.26)
Now following the proof of Lemma 4.6 and using (4.23)-(4.26) we get V = V̂ . Therefore
from (4.22) and (2.8) we see that vˆ2 is an outer maximizing selector. Hence the proof. 
Finally we are ready to prove Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Existence of (V,Λ) ∈ C2(Rd) × R which satisfies (2.7) follows from
Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.4. Lemma 4.3 implies (i). (ii) follows from Lemma 4.5 and (iii)
follows from Lemma 4.6. Verification part (iv) follows from Lemma 4.7. 
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